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Abstract
When rationing a resource or adjudicating conflicting claims, the arrival of new agents necessi-
tates revision. Adopting a worst-case perspective, we introduce guarantee structures to measure
the protection a rule provides to either individuals or groups in these circumstances. With the
goal of maximizing guarantees for those in the original group, we characterize the constrained
equal awards rule. Requiring that a rule provide protection for both the original and arriving
agents, so that both gains and losses are shared, we characterize the Talmud rule.
Keywords: Claims problem, guarantee structures, worst-case analysis, Talmud rule, con-
strained equal awards rule.
JEL Classification: D63, D70.
∗Address: Department of Economics, University of Glasgow, UK; e-mail: patrick.harless@glasgow.ac.uk. I thank
participants at the 2016 Spring Midwest Economic Theory Meeting and 2016 Fall Midwest Economic Theory Meeting
for helpful discussion. I am grateful to William Thomson and also thank Juan Moreno-Ternero and two anonymous
referees for extensive comments.
1
1 Introduction
Facing pervasive scarcity, we often find several agents with incompatible claims to a resource and
must resort to rationing.1 Whether dividing an estate, liquidating a firm, or allocating funds among
researchers,2 we seek methods with desirable properties. The problem of adjudication, already chal-
lenging when all relevant information is known, is compounded in a fluid and dynamic environment.
Changes in the environment – whether the amount to divide, demands of the claimants, or even
the population of claimants themselves – can be expected. Whether a division method responds
favorably to such changes becomes an important consideration. Pursuing this line of inquiry, we
investigate how rules respond to the arrival of new agents with valid claims.
To evaluate rules, we measure the extent to which they may revise original awards to accommo-
date new agents. Rules which limit this revision are able to guarantee that agents retain at least
some portion of their original award, thereby providing a valuable sense of protection to the original
agents. In more detail, fixing the numbers of original and arriving agents, we compare the awards
proposed for the original agents before and after the arrival of the new agents. A guarantee mea-
sures the smallest fraction that a single agent may receive of her tentative award in the augmented
problem and a group guarantee identifies the smallest average of the individual award ratios.3 For
example, a guarantee of one-third ensures that each original agent retains at least one-third of her
original award, regardless of the claims of the arriving agents.
Just as agents may legitimately object to the expropriation of their entire award to compensate
arriving agents, so too may they complain when forced to bear all of the losses when new agents
arrive. Guarantees respond to the first objection; to respond to the second, we introduce dual
guarantees. Dual guarantees apply the ideas underpinning guarantees to losses rather than awards,
thereby ensuring that arriving agents share the required sacrifice.
So far, we have defined guarantees for fixed group sizes, whereas we seek rules that perform
well for all populations. Taking this into account, the guarantee structure of a rule parameterizes
guarantees (or group guarantees) by the numbers of original and arriving agents. Rather than
summarize the performance of a rule by a single number, the typical approach to worst case
analysis, guarantee structures offer a comprehensive description of performance across settings.
Consequently, guarantee structures permit both nuanced comparisons between rules and strong
recommendations when these comparisons are uniformly favorable or unfavorable to a rule.
Given their richness, we might suspect that guarantee structures preclude unambiguous com-
1The literature on claims (or bankruptcy) problems begins with O’Neill (1982). For a thorough analysis of the
existing literature, see Thomson (2003), Thomson (2014), and Thomson (2015a).
2Rationing is also required in the commonly studied school assignment problem (e.g., Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez
(2003), Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2006), and Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2009)). When lotteries are allowed, seats are
effectively divisible and techniques developed for adjudicating conflicting claims can be applied.
3If the original award is zero, the fraction is undefined. For concreteness, we set 0
0
= 1 so that an agent who
receives a zero award in both cases has a full guarantee, although our results do not depend on this choice.
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parisons. In fact, we find that guarantee structures not only permit comparisons, but identify some
rules as uniformly best. As a preliminary result, we establish bounds on guarantees (Lemma 2)
and compute the guarantees of rules in a one-parameter family4 among which these bounds are
attained (Proposition 1). Our main results characterize two well-known rules. First, among endow-
ment continuous and consistent rules, the constrained equal awards rule uniquely maximizes group
guarantees (Theorem 1).5 Thus, maximizing group guarantees essentially requires a rule to assign
awards as equally as possible among claimants. Our second result characterizes the Talmud rule,6
which aims to equal awards for small endowments but to equalize losses for large endowments.
Among consistent rules, the Talmud rule is the only rule to simultaneously maximize guarantees
and dual guarantees (Theorem 2). The Talmud rule thus arises as the most robust to revision when
new agents arrive. Taken together, these results help to relate guarantee structures to equity and
robustness properties appearing in other characterizations of these rules.7
Testing the robustness of our approach, we also consider collective guarantees, which measure
group protection by the total award received by the group. This leads to a measure generally
equivalent to guarantees (Lemma 1). Furthermore, we show that maximizing guarantees and group
guarantees is generally equivalent to meeting focal lower bounds (Proposition 2).8
Deferring further discussion of related literature, we formalize the model and introduce guar-
antee structures in Section 2. Section 3 presents our characterizations and Section 4 discusses
extensions and related literature. Proofs appear in the appendix.
2 Model
A claims problem consists of a finite set of agents with conflicting claims over an amount to divide.
Formally, there is a countably infinite set of potential agents indexed by N.9 For each N ∈ N , a
claims problem for N is a pair (c, E) ∈ RN+ × R+ such that E ≤
∑
i∈N ci where ci is agent i’s
claim and E is the endowment.10 The set of all claims problems for N is CN ≡ {(c, E) ∈
RN+ ×R+ : E ≤
∑
i∈N ci
}
. A rule is a mapping ϕ defined on
⋃
N∈N CN such that for each N ∈ N
and each (c, E) ∈ CN , 0 ≤ ϕ(c, E) ≤ c and ∑i∈N ϕi(c, E) = E. Finally, by convention, let 00 = 1
4This is the “TAL-family” introduced by Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006b).
5Endowment continuity requires that small changes in the endowment lead to small changes in awards; consistency
requires that awards remain the same when some agents depart with their awards and the situation is reassessed.
6The Talmud rule first appears in Aumann and Maschler (1985). Dagan (1996) provides several characterizations
of the Talmud and constrained equal awards rules by standard properties.
7For example, see Dagan (1996), Aumann and Maschler (1985), and Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006b).
8Our formal results adapt the properties introduced by Herrero and Villar (2001) and Moreno-Ternero and Villar
(2004).
9By N, R, R+, and R++, we denote respectively the natural (excluding zero), real, non-negative real, and positive
real numbers. Also, N denotes the finite subsets of N.
10For vector x ∈ RN+ , xN′ ≡ (xi)i∈N′ denotes the components of x corresponding to N ′. With slight abuse of
notation, we write xi for x{i} and x−i for xN\{i}. For vectors x, y ∈ RN+ , we write x  y, x < y, and x ≤ y for
standard inequalities.
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and for each δ ∈ R++, let δ0 =∞.
2.1 Properties and rules
Several standard properties play a role in our analysis. First, equal treatment of equals says that
agents with the same claim receive the same award; endowment continuity requires that small
changes in the endowment lead to at most small revisions in awards11; and endowment monotonicity
requires that when the endowment decreases, no agent’s award increases. Finally, consistency says
that when one agent departs with her award, then the awards of the remaining agents should be
unchanged when the rule is reapplied to distribute the remaining endowment among those agents.12
Given ϕ, the formal requirements, stated for each N ∈ N and each (c, E) ∈ CN , are:
Equal treatment of equals: For each pair i, j ∈ N , if ci = cj , then ϕi(c, E) = ϕj(c, E).
Endowment continuity: For each sequence {Eν}ν∈N ⊆ R+ such that for each ν ∈ N, Eν ∈
[0,
∑
i∈N ci], if E
ν → E,13 then ϕ(c, Eν)→ ϕ(c, E).
Endowment monotonicity: For each E′ ∈ R+, if E′ ≤ E, then ϕ(c, E′) ≤ ϕ(c, E).
Consistency: For each M ⊆ N , ϕM (c, E) = ϕ
(
cM , E −
∑
i∈N\M ϕi(c, E)
)
.
We now turn to rules. Those arising from our analysis are members of a one-parameter family.
Each rule in the family begins by equally dividing awards until a pre-determined fraction of each
claim is filled and then switches to equally dividing losses.14
TAL-family rule with respect to θ ∈ [0, 1], T θ: For each N ∈ N , each (c, E) ∈ CN , and each
i ∈ N ,
T θi (c, E) ≡
min{θci, δ} if E ≤ θ ·
∑
i∈N ci
max{θci, ci − δ} otherwise
where δ ∈ R is chosen so that ∑i∈N T θi (c, E) = E.
All rules in the family satisfy equal treatment of equals, endowment continuity, endowment mono-
tonicity, and consistency. Within this family, we distinguish three members: T 1 is the constrained
11This property is sometimes called endowment endowment continuity to distinguish it from a stronger property
which requires the same conclusion for joint changes in the claims and endowment. As we only consider this version,
we adopt the shorter name.
12See Thomson (2012) for a thorough normative analysis of the consistency principle and Thomson (2015b) for a
survey on its applications.
13We write ϕ(c, Eν) → ϕ(c, E) fi for each  ∈ R++, there is ν0 ∈ N such that for all ν ∈ N such that ν ≥ ν0,∑
i∈N |ϕi(c, Eν)− ϕi(c, E)| < .
14This family, studied by Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006b), generalizes a rule originating from the Talmud
(Aumann and Maschler, 1985). It comprises the consistent and homogeneous members of a further generalized
family introduced by Thomson (2008). This in turn is a subfamily of the class of (fully) continuous and consistent
rules that satisfy equal treatment of equals (Young, 1987).
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equal awards (CEA) rule, T 1/2 is the Talmud (T) rule, and T 0 is the constrained equal
losses (CEL) rule.
Each rule may also be applied to distribute losses instead of awards, which defines its dual.
Formally, for each N ∈ N and each (c, E) ∈ CN , the dual of ϕ, ϕd, allocates losses according to ϕ:
ϕd(c, E) ≡ c − ϕ(c,∑i∈N ci − E).15 Within the TAL-family, for each θ ∈ [0, 1], T θ and T 1−θ are
dual (Proposition 1, Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006b)). Thus, CEA and CEL are dual rules and
T is its own dual, or self dual.
2.2 Guarantee structures
In general, adding agents to a problem without increasing the available resources decreases the
awards of original agents. Our goal is to bound the “worst case” revision that may be required
for original agents considered individually or as a group. To fix the context, let ϕ be a rule and
n,m ∈ N represent the numbers of original and arriving agents. Comparing awards before and
after including the new agents, we compute the ratio of awards for each original agent.16 The
guarantee of ϕ for (n,m) is then the smallest (infimum) ratio over all problems involving the
specified numbers of agents. Guarantees measure the extent to which a single agent’s award may
be revised.
In addition to this individualistic perspective, we are interested in the revisions required of
the original agents considered as a group. For our primary measure, we compute the ratio of
awards for each original agent in a pair of problems as before and then average these ratios. Again
searching over all problems, the group guarantee of ϕ for (n,m) is the smallest (infimum)
average ratio. This perspective gives each agent’s proportional sacrifice equal weight, judging a
given absolute sacrifice to be more significant when it represents a larger share of an agent’s award.
An alternative measure instead equally weights the absolute sacrifices, summing the awards of the
original agents in each problem and then computing the ratio of these amounts. The collective
guarantee of ϕ for (n,m) is the smallest (infimum) average ratio.17 Formally,18 we define
15Aumann and Maschler (1985) introduce duality to the study of claims problems.
16Absolute differences also measure the extent of revision required. For an agent with a particular award, absolute
and proportional measures provide the same information. In general, however, absolute revisions increase with the
size of claims, so worst-case analysis requires some form of normalization. To the extent that absolute differences are
deemed the appropriate measures of revision, proportional revisions can be viewed as their normalizations.
17Both guarantees and group guarantees have been applied to bargaining solutions (Thomson and Lensberg, 1983;
Thomson, 1983a) while collective guarantees have not. While adding awards is natural in our environment, the
corresponding summation is would be questionable in bargaining problems where it would involve addition of utilities
across agents and be susceptible to re-scaling.
18Some agents may receive zero awards. To interpret these cases, recall our convention that 0
0
= 1 and for each
a ∈ R++, a0 =∞.
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Guarantee of ϕ for (n,m), G(ϕ, n,m):
G(ϕ, n,m) ≡ inf
{
ϕi((c, cˆ), E)
ϕi(c, E)
:
N,M ∈ N , N ∩M = ∅, |N | = n, |M | = m,
i ∈ N, (c, E) ∈ CN , cˆ ∈ RM+
}
.
Group guarantee of ϕ for (n,m), G¯(ϕ, n,m):
G¯(ϕ, n,m) ≡ inf
{
1
n
∑
i∈N
ϕi((c, cˆ), E)
ϕi(c, E)
:
N,M ∈ N , N ∩M = ∅, |N | = n, |M | = m,
(c, E) ∈ CN , cˆ ∈ RM+
}
.
Collective guarantee of ϕ for (n,m), Gˆ(ϕ, n,m):
Gˆ(ϕ, n,m) ≡ inf
{
1
E
∑
N
ϕi(cN∪M , E) :
N,M ∈ N , N ∩M = ∅, |N | = n, |M | = m,
(cN , E) ∈ CN , cM ∈ RM+
}
.
Gathering values for all population sizes defines a guarantee structure. We call Gϕ ≡
(G(ϕ, n,m))n,m∈N, G¯ϕ ≡ (G¯(ϕ, n,m))n,m∈N, and Gˆϕ ≡ (Gˆ(ϕ, n,m))n,m∈N respectively the guar-
antee structure, group guarantee structure, and collective guarantee structure of ϕ. Of
course, when the original group consists of a single agent, these measures coincide. More interest-
ingly, collective guarantees are generally equivalent to guarantees.
Lemma 1. Let ϕ be an endowment monotonic and consistent rule. Then for each pair n,m ∈ N,
G(ϕ, n,m) = Gˆ(ϕ, n,m).
Intuitively, these measures coincide because the “worst cases”occur when a single agent in the
original group has a non-trivial claim.
Further methods of comparison might consider the profiles of individual ratios directly. Pro-
ceeding lexicographically beginning with the smallest ratios, the goal of maximizing the minimum
ratios would refine the comparisons made according to our guarantees. Beginning instead with the
largest ratios defines an approach which deems worse situations in which even the most protected
agent’s ratio is small. Comparing rules in this way refines comparisons according to our group
guarantees. Thus, while our focus remains on guarantees and group guarantees, our conclusions
also inform reasonable alternatives.
Finally, we introduce the dual guarantees and dual group guarantees of ϕ, the guarantees
and group guarantees of ϕd, which shift the focus from awards to losses. To interpret, we rewrite
the ratio in the definition of a guarantee for ϕd in terms of ϕ:
ϕdi ((c, cˆ), E)
ϕdi (c, E)
=
ci − ϕi((c, cˆ),
∑
i∈N∪M ci − E)
ci − ϕi(c,
∑
i∈N ci − E)
.
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Moving from (c,
∑
i∈N ci−E) to
(
(c, cˆ),
∑
i∈N∪M ci−E
)
postulates the arrival of additional agents
together with sufficient additional funds to cover their entire claims. If the ratio is positive, then
the original agent incurs at least some of the loss in the augmented problem; a positive dual
guarantee says that the original agents always share in the sacrifice in this case. Normatively, the
dual guarantee ensures that the arriving agents are protected. Focusing on the case where E = 0
and reversing the roles of the original arriving agents, the situation now matches the hypothetical
considered by a guarantee.19 Summarizing, dual guarantees protect agents against incurring all of
the additional losses created when new agents arrive.
3 Results
3.1 Bounds on guarantees and the TAL-family
Our goal is to identify those rules which provide the largest guarantees. Our first result establishes
general upper bounds on guarantees and group guarantees. From the definitions, the bounds apply
to the dual notions as well.
Lemma 2. For rule ϕ and each pair n,m ∈ N, G(ϕ, n,m) ≤ 11+m and G¯(ϕ, n,m) ≤ nn+m .
Proof. Let ϕ be a rule, n,m ∈ N, E ∈ R++, and N,M ∈ N with N ∩M = ∅, |N | = n, and
|M | = m. Let c ∈ RN+ and cˆ ∈ RM+ denote claims for the two groups to be specified subsequently.
We consider two cases according to whether ϕ treats agents symmetrically.
Case 1: ϕ satisfies equal treatment of equals. To establish the first bound, let c ≡ (0, . . . , 0)
and cˆ ≡ (E, . . . , E). By feasibility and equal treatment of equals,
ϕ(c, E) = (0, . . . , 0, E)
ϕ((c, cˆ), E) =
(
0, . . . , 0, E1+m ,
E
1+m , . . . ,
E
1+m
)
.
Moving from the smaller to larger economy, the ratio of awards for agent n is
E/(1 +m)
E
=
1
1 +m
.
Therefore, G(ϕ, n,m) ≤ 11+m .
To establish the second bound, let c ≡ (E, . . . , E) and cˆ ≡ (E, . . . , E). By equal treatment of
equals, ϕ(c, E) =
(
E
n , . . . ,
E
n
)
and ϕ((c, cˆ), E) =
(
E
n+m , . . . ,
E
n+m
)
. For each i ∈ N ,
ϕi((c, cˆ), E)
ϕi(c, E)
=
E/(n+m)
E/n
=
n
n+m
.
19Thus, for each pair n,m ∈ N, it is appropriate to pair G(ϕ, n,m) with G(ϕd,m, n). Since our goal will be to
maximize all guarantees, the interchange of group sizes does not bear on the interpretation of our results.
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Therefore, G¯(ϕ, n,m) ≤ nn+m .
Case 2: General rules. To establish the first bound, let i ∈ N and
G∗i ≡ inf
{
ϕi((c, cˆ), E)
ϕi(c, E)
: (c, E) ∈ CN , cˆ ∈ RM+
}
.
Suppose that G∗i > 11+m and ci ≡ E, cN\{i} ≡ (0, . . . , 0), and cˆ ≡ (E, . . . , E).
By feasibility, ϕi(c, E) = E, so ϕi((c, cˆ), E) ≥ G∗i ·ϕi(c, E) > E1+m . Then there is j ∈M such that
ϕj((c, cˆ), E) <
E
1+m . Let N
′ ≡ (N\{i})∪{j}, M ′ ≡ (M\{j})∪{i}, c′ ≡ (cj)j∈N ′ , and cˆ′ ≡ (cj)j∈M ′ .
Then |N ′| = n and |M ′| = m. By feasibility, ϕj(cN ′ , E) = E and ϕj(cN ′∪M ′ , E) = ϕj((c, cˆ), E).
Then
G(ϕ, n,m) ≤ ϕj((c
′, cˆ′), E)
ϕj(c′, E)
=
ϕj((c, cˆ), E)
E
<
E/(1 +m)
E
=
1
1 +m
.
To establish the second bound, for each i ∈ N ∪M , let ci ≡ En , and x ≡ ϕ((c, cˆ), E). Label
the agents in increasing order according to x, breaking ties arbitrarily. Let N ′ ⊆ N ∪M consist
of n agents with the smallest awards, M ′ ≡ (N ∪M)\N ′, c′ ≡ (cj)j∈N ′ , and cˆ′ ≡ (cj)j∈M ′ . If
x1 = xn+m, then the arguments from Case 1 apply, so suppose instead that x1 < xn+m.
By feasibility, for each i ∈ N ′, ϕi(c′, E) = En , so
G¯(ϕ, n,m) ≤ 1
n
∑
i∈N ′
ϕi((c
′, cˆ′), E)
ϕi(c′, E)
=
1
n
∑
i∈N ′
xi
E/n
=
1
E
∑
i∈N ′
xi <
nE/(n+m)
E
=
n
n+m
.
In the proof, we first identify problems in which the bounds bind for rules that satisfy equal
treatment of equals. The second part of the argument illustrates that asymmetric treatment entails
a trade-off: Improving some of the ratios comes at the expense of other ratios, ultimately decreasing
the smallest ratios and the guarantees of the rule.
We now search for rules which attain these bounds. To this end, we compute the guarantees
and group guarantees of rules in the TAL-family and thereby show that the bounds are attained.
Proposition 1. For each pair n,m ∈ N with n ≥ 2, and each θ ∈ [0, 1], G(T θ, n,m) = min{θ, 11+m}
and G¯(T θ, n,m) = min{θ, nn+m}.
Proof. Let θ ∈ [0, 1], n,m ∈ N, and N,M ∈ N with N ∩M = ∅, |N | = n, and |M | = m.
Upper bounds: G(T θ, n,m) ≤ min{θ, 1
1+m
} and G¯(T θ, n,m) = min{θ, n
n+m
}. By
Lemma 2, G(T θ, n,m) ≤ 11+m and G¯(T θ, n,m) ≤ nn+m . To establish the remaining bounds, let
d ∈ R++, c ≡ (δ, . . . , δ), cˆ ≡ ((n+ 1)δ, 0, . . . , 0), and E ≡ nδ. Then T θ(c, E) = (δ, . . . , δ). Because
δ− θδ ≤ (n+ 1)δ−nδ−nθδ, each original agent will receive at most θδ in the augmented economy.
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First consider guarantees and suppose θ ≤ 11+m . Since θ ≤ 11+m ≤ 12 , E = nδ ≥ (n+ 1)θδ and
so E − (n+ 1)θδ ≥ θδ. Therefore,
T θ(CN∪M , E) = (θδ, . . . , θδ, E − nθδ, 0, . . . , 0).
For each i ∈ N , the ratio of awards is θδδ = θ. Thus, G(T θ, n,m) ≤ θ.
Next consider group guarantees. We have
T θ(CN∪M , E) =
(
θδ, . . . , θδ, E−nθδm , . . . ,
E−nθδ
m
)
.
For each i ∈ N , the ratio of awards is θδδ = θ. Thus, G¯(T θ, n,m) ≤ θ.
Lower bounds: G(T θ, n,m) ≥ min{θ, 1
1+m
} and G¯(T θ, n,m) ≥ min{θ, n
n+m
}. Let
(c, E) ∈ CN , cˆ ∈ RM+ , x ≡ T θ(c, E), and x′ ≡ T θ((c, cˆ), E). Without loss of generality, label
the agents so that c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cn. We distinguish three cases.
Case 1: E ≤ ∑i∈N θci. Then x = CEA(θc, E), x′ = CEA(θ(c, cˆ), E), and the bounds for the
constrained equal awards rule apply: For each i ∈ N , x′ixi ≥ 11+m .
Case 2: E ≥∑i∈N∪M θci. Then for each i ∈ N , x′i ≥ θci. Since xi ≤ ci, this implies x′ixi ≥ θcici = θ.
Case 3:
∑
i∈N θci < E <
∑
i∈N∪M θci. Then x
′ = CEA(θ(c, cˆ), E) and there are δ ∈ R++ and
k ∈ N such that
xM = (θc1, . . . , θck, δ, . . . , δ) .
Moreover, δ = max{x′i : i ∈ N ∪M}. Let i ∈ N . If i ≤ k, then x
′
i
xi
≥ θcici = θ. If i > k, then
xi − x′i ≤
∑
j∈M x
′
j ≤ mδ, so xi ≤ mθ + x′i = (1 + m)θ. Then x
′
i
xi
≥ δ(1+m)δ = 11+m . Altogether,
G(T θ, n,m) ≥ min{θ, 11+m}.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, x′ixi ≥
θci
ci
= θ. The average ratio among the agents {k + 1, . . . , n} is
smallest when the losses are spread equally and k = 0. In this case, for each i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , n},
xi ≤ En and x′i ≥ En+m so
x′i
xi
≥ E/(n+m)
E/n
=
n
n+m
.
The group guarantee is at least kn · θ + n−kn · nn+m ≥ min
{
θ, nn+m
}
. Therefore, G¯(T θ, n,m) ≥
min
{
θ, nn+m
}
.
Since for each θ ∈ [0, 1], T θ and T 1−θ are dual, the results also describe the dual guaran-
tees and dual group guarantees: For each pair n,m ∈ N, G((T θ)d, n,m) = min{1 − θ, 11+m} and
G¯((T θ)d, n,m) = min{1− θ, nn+m}.
Comparing with the bounds in Lemma 2, we see that several rules in the family maximize
guarantees. This is true of all members for which θ ≥ 12 . On the other hand, since n and m may be
9
chosen so that nn+m is arbitrarily close to 1, maximizing group guarantees requires θ = 1 so that T
θ
is the constrained equal awards rule. Simultaneously maximizing guarantees and dual guarantees
is possible, though again achieved by a single member of the family, the Talmud rule itself. The
constrained equal losses rule maximizes dual group guarantees and does so uniquely within the
family; consequently, no rule in the family simultaneously maximizes group guarantees and dual
group guarantees.
3.2 Characterizations
As our observations about the TAL-family suggest, the goal of maximizing notions of guarantees
leads quickly to specific recommendations of rules. Beginning with a group perspective, we identify
the constrained equal awards as the unique endowment continuous and consistent rule to maximize
group guarantees.
Theorem 1. The constrained equal awards rule is the unique endowment continuous and consistent
rule to maximize group guarantees.
Proof. The constrained equal awards rule maximizes group guarantees (Proposition 1) and is well
known to satisfy the other properties (e.g., Young (1987)). To prove the converse, let ϕ be a
endowment continuous and consistent rule that maximizes group guarantees.
Step 1: ϕ satisfies equal treatment of equals. Let k, n ∈ N with 2 ≤ k < n, N ∈ N with
|N | = n, and δ ∈ R+. Also let i ∈ N , E ≡ kδ, cδ ≡ (δ)j∈N , and x ≡ ϕ(cδ, E). For each S ⊆ N
with i ∈ S and |S| = k, ϕ(cδS , E) = (δ)j∈S , so
k
n
= G¯(ϕ, k, n− k) ≤ 1
k
∑
j∈S
xj
δ
=
1
E
∑
j∈S
xj .
That is,
∑
j∈S xj ≥ kEn . Now agent i is a member of
(
n−1
k−1
)
such subgroups and each other agent is
a member of
(
n−2
k−1
)
such subgroups. Summing awards over these subsets,(
n− 1
k − 1
)
kE
n
=
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
xi +
(
n− 2
k − 2
) ∑
j∈N\{i}
xj
=
[(
n− 1
k − 1
)
−
(
n− 2
k − 2
)]
xi +
(
n− 2
k − 2
)∑
j∈N
xj
=
n− k
k − 1
(
n− 2
k − 2
)
xi +
(
n− 2
k − 2
)
E.
Rearranging,
n− k
k − 1
(
n− 2
k − 2
)
xi =
[
k
n
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
−
(
n− 2
k − 2
)]
E =
n− k
n(k − 1)
(
n− 2
k − 2
)
E.
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Therefore, xi =
E
n =
kδ
n . Since this is true for each i ∈ N , ϕ(cδ, E) =
(
kδ
n , . . . ,
kδ
n
)
= CEA(cδ, E).
By consistency, for each pair i, j ∈ N , ϕ((cδi , cδj), 2kδn ) = (kδn , kδn ). Moreover, the argument shows
that this is true for each pair k, n ∈ N with 2 ≤ k < n. For each E ∈ [δ, 2δ] and each  ∈ R++,
there is a pair k, n ∈ N with 2 ≤ k < n such that ∣∣2kδn − E∣∣ < . Then by endowment continuity,
ϕ(cδ, E) = CEA(cδ, E). Since δ ∈ R+ was arbitrary, ϕ satisfies equal treatment of equals on the
domain of two-claimant problems. By consistency, ϕ satisfies equal treatment of equals generally.
Since ϕ satisfies equal treatment of equals, endowment continuity, and consistency, it also satisfies
endowment monotonicity (Young, 1987).20
Step 2: ϕ = CEA on the domain of two-claimant problems. Let N ∈ N with |N | = 2,
(c, E) ∈ CN with c1 ≤ c2, and x ≡ ϕ(c, E). We consider three cases according to the size of the
endowment relative to the smallest claim.
Case 1: E ∈ [0, c1]. For each i ∈ N , (ci, E) ∈ C{i} and ϕi(ci, E) = E. Since G¯(ϕ, 1, 1) = 12 , xi ≥ E2 .
This is true for both agents, so x =
(
E
2 ,
E
2
)
= CEA(c, E).
Case 2: E ∈ [c1, 2c1]. Suppose by way of contradiction that x 6=
(
E
2 ,
E
2
)
and label the agents
so that xi <
E
2 < xj . Then there is k ∈ N such that kxi + E < (k + 1)c1. Let M ∈ N with
N ∩M = ∅ and |M | = k, cˆ ≡ (ci)h∈M . Then ((ci, cˆ), kxi + E) ∈ C{i}∪M . By equal treatment
of equals, ϕ(c{i}∪M , kxi + E) =
(
kxi+E
k+1 , . . . ,
kxi+E
k+1
)
. Also, by consistency, for each h ∈ {i} ∪M ,
ϕh((c, cˆ), kxi + E) = xi. Now comparing group guarantees,
k + 1
k + 2
= G¯(ϕ, k + 1, 1) ≤ 1
k + 1
∑
h∈{i}∪M
ϕh((c, cˆ), kxi + E)
ϕh((ci, cˆ), kxi + E)
=
xi
(kxi + E)/(k + 1)
.
But then E ≤ 2xi, which contradicts E = xi+xj > 2xi. Instead, xi = xj = E2 and x = CEA(c, E).
Case 3: E ∈ [2c1, c1 + c2]. By Case 2, ϕ(c, 2c1) = (c1, c1). By endowment monotonicity, for each
E ∈ [2c1, c1 + c2], ϕ(c, E) = (c1, E − c1) = CEA(c, E). Therefore, ϕ = CEA on the domain of
two-claimant problems.
Step 3: ϕ = CEA. By Step 2, ϕ = CEA for all two-claimant problems. As CEA is its own
unique consistent extension from the two-claimant case, ϕ = CEA generally.21
Adopting the perspective of an individual, we find that a wide range of rules maximize either
guarantees or dual guarantees (see Example 1). In fact, it is possible to combine these objectives
to ensure both protection of awards and sharing of losses. Combining these goals with consistency
characterizes the Talmud rule.
20Although Young (1987) invokes continuity with respect to both claims and endowment, the argument for this
implication (Lemma 1) relies only on endowment continuity.
21Because CEA is also “conversely consistent,” this step is an application of the “Elevator Lemma” (Thomson,
2015b).
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Theorem 2. The Talmud rule is the unique consistent rule to maximize guarantees and maximum
dual guarantees.
Proof. The Talmud rule maximizes guarantees (Proposition 1) and is well known to be consistent
(e.g., Aumann and Maschler (1985)). To prove the converse, let ϕ be a consistent rule such that
for each pair n,m ∈ N, G(ϕ, n,m) = G(ϕd, n,m) = 11+m . We show that ϕ coincides with T on the
domain of two-claimant problems and conclude by invoking consistency. Let N ∈ N with |N | = 2,
(c, E) ∈ CN , and label the agents so that c1 ≤ c2. We consider three cases according to the size of
the endowment relative to the claims.
Case 1: E ∈ [0, c1]. If ϕ(c, E) 6= T (c, E) = (E2 , E2 ), then there there is a labeling of the agents
i, j ∈ N such that ϕi(c, E) < E2 < ϕj(c, E). Let i ∈ N . By feasibility, ϕi(ci, E) = E, so
1
2
= G(ϕ, 1, 1) ≤ ϕi(c, E)
ϕi(ci, E)
=
ϕi(c, E)
E
.
Then ϕi(c, E) ≥ E2 . Since this is true for both agents and ϕ1(c, E) + ϕ2(c, E) = E, the statements
hold with equality and ϕi(c, E) =
(
E
2 ,
E
2
)
= T (c, E).
Case 2: E ∈ [c2, c1 + c2]. Then
∑
i∈N ci − E ∈ [0, c1]. Now ϕ(c, E) = c − ϕd(c,
∑
i∈N ci − E)
and G(ϕd, 1, 1) = 11+1 = 12 , so the argument from Case 1 applies to ϕd. Thus, ϕd(c,
∑
i∈N ci−E) =
( c1+c2−E2 ,
c1+c2−E
2 ) and ϕ(c, E) = c−ϕd(c,
∑
i∈N ci−E) = (c1− c1+c2−E2 , c2− c1+c2−E2 ) = T (c, E).
Case 3: E ∈ [c1, c2]. Suppose by way of contradiction that ϕ(c, E) 6= T (c, E) = ( c12 , E − c12 ).
Then c1 < c2 and either ϕ1(c, E) <
c1
2 or ϕ1(c, E) >
c1
2 .
Subcase 3.1: ϕ1(c, E) <
c1
2 . Then ϕ2(c, E) > E− c12 and there is k ∈ N such that Ek < c12 −ϕ1(c, E) =
ϕ2(c, E) +
c1
2 −E. Let M ∈ N with N ∩M = ∅ and |M | = k and for each i ∈M , let ci ≡ c2. Since
E
k+2 <
E
k <
c1
2 <
c2
2 , for each i ∈ N ∪M , ϕ((c, cˆ), E) = Ek+2 . Now the ratio for agent 2 is
ϕ2((c, cˆ), E)
ϕ2(c, E)
<
E/(k + 2)
E/k + E − c1/2 <
E/(k + 2)
E/k + E
=
k
(k + 1)(k + 2)
<
1
k + 1
.
But then G(ϕ, 2, k) < 1k+1 , a contradiction.
Subcase 3.2: ϕ1(c, E) >
c1
2 . Then ϕ2(c, E) < E − c12 and T d2 (c, c1 + c2 − E) = c2 − (E − c12 ) <
c2 − ϕ2(c, E) = ϕd2(c, c1 + c2 − E). Repeating the argument from subcase 3.1, G(ϕd, 2, k) < 1k+1 ,
again a contradiction. Instead, ϕ(c, E) = T (c, E).
Altogether, ϕ coincides with the Talmud rule on the domain of two-claimant problems. By
consistency, ϕ = T .
Steps 1 and 2 in the proof establish that a rule satisfying the properties must coincide with the
Talmud rule for large and small endowments. The conclusion of Step 3 would be implied directly
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by either endowment continuity or endowment monotonicity, but in fact neither is necessary. In-
stead, the argument relies on consistency to compare awards across populations of different sizes,
effectively establishing endowment continuity.
By duality, Theorem 1 can be adapted to characterize the constrained equal losses rule. Em-
phasizing duality also provides a way to distinguish the Talmud rule among the many consistent
rules which maximize guarantees.
Corollary 1. (i) The constrained equal losses rule is the unique endowment continuous and con-
sistent rule to maximize dual group guarantees.
(ii) The Talmud rule is the unique consistent and self dual rule to maximize guarantees.
Unfortunately, as the characterizations make clear, no rule simultaneously maximizes group
guarantees and dual group guarantees.
To conclude, we illustrate the diversity of rules which maximize guarantees. Further examples
establishing independence of axioms appear in the appendix.
Example 1. A family of endowment continuous and consistent rules that maximize
guarantees. Let ϕ˜ be endowment continuous and consistent and θ ∈ [12 , 1]. For each (c, E) ∈ CN ,
let
ϕ(c, E) ≡
T θ
(
θc, E
)
if E ≤∑i∈N ci2
c
2 + ϕ˜
(
c
2 , E
)
if E >
∑
i∈N
ci
2 .
Then ϕ is endowment continuous and consistent. Moreover, based on our previous results, ϕ
maximizes guarantees: For each n,m ∈ N, G(ϕ, n,m) = 11+m . The family is large because, aside
from the two basic properties, ϕ˜ is unrestricted. For example, ϕ˜ may give priority to large claims
over small claims or vice versa and thus diverge widely from both the constrained equal awards
and Talmud rules. It may even give priority to some agents over others, thereby violating equal
treatment of equals.
The rules defined in Example 1 coincide with the constrained equal awards rule for small endow-
ments. Once small awards are “locked in,” however, only the implications of endowment continuity
and consistency restrict the behavior of the rule. Thus, maximizing guarantees is consistent with
highly asymmetric treatment among agents.
3.3 Lower Bounds
Like guarantees, lower bounds22 provide protection or insurance for the awards agents may expect.
In contrast with guarantees, lower bounds apply to individual claims problems. They are therefore
parameterized by the data in a problem, namely the sizes of the population, the agents’ claims,
22See Thomson (2015a) for a thorough discussion of lower bounds in the literature.
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and the endowment. Reflecting the similar normative motivation for these ideas, we find a close
relation between lower bounds and the guarantee structures we introduce.
We consider two leading lower bounds applied to endowment monotonic and consistent rules.
First, the 1n -truncated-claims lower bound requires that each agent receive at least an equal share of
the smaller between the endowment and the agent’s claim. Second, the conditional equal division
lower bound requires that each agent who is not fully compensated receive at least an equal share
of the endowment. Given ϕ, the formal requirements, stated for each N ∈ N and each (c, E) ∈ CN ,
are:
1
n
-truncated-claims lower bound: For each i ∈ N , ϕi(c, E) ≥ 1n min{ci, E}.
Conditional equal division lower bound: For each i ∈ N , ϕi(c, E) ≥ min{ci, En }.
Whereas the 1n -truncated-claims lower bound imposes a bound satisfied by many rules, the
conditional equal division lower bound is much more restrictive; not only does it directly imply
the 1n -truncated-claims lower bound, but together with consistency, characterizes CEA.
23 This
characterization parallels our Theorem 1, thereby connecting the bound to maximal group guar-
antees. The 1n -truncated-claims lower bound also carries implications for guarantees. In fact, rules
satisfying this bound maximize guarantees.
Proposition 2. Let ϕ be an endowment monotonic and consistent rule. Then ϕ (i) maximizes
guarantees if and only if it satisfies the 1n -truncated-claims lower-bound and (ii) maximizes group
guarantees if and only if it satisfies the conditional equal division lower-bound.
To prove Proposition 2, we show that a rule satisfies the 1n -truncated-claims lower-bound if and
only if it maximizes guarantee when the original population consists of a single agent. This is
straightforward because the agent’s award is always bounded by sizes of the endowment and her
claim. The generalization to all guarantees is a consequence of a more subtle argument in the proof
of Lemma 1.
4 Discussion and related literature
Formally, we study the familiar model of claims problems and characterize rules known to satisfy
many desirable properties. The goal of maximizing guarantees provides a new perspective on claims
problems while confirming the centrality of two leading rules.
As with the model, our normative motivation is familiar. Worst-case analysis has become a com-
mon standard of comparison with recent applications to cost sharing, probabilistic assignment of
23It is straightforward and well-known that only CEA satisfies the bound with two agents; consistency extends
this result to populations of all sizes (see, for example, Thomson (2014)).
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objects, and network routing.24 However, in contrast with guarantee structures, these applications
propose measures which summarize the performance of a rule by a single number. By parameteriz-
ing by population sizes, guarantee structures offer a more nuanced description of performance and
allow more definitive comparisons among rules.
We have shown that guarantees relate to important lower bounds which are motivated by similar
normative goals (Herrero and Villar, 2001; Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2004).25 Guarantees also
reflect solidarity principles, notably population monotonicity.26 Applied to claims problems, this
property requires that when new agents arrive, no agent’s award increases. It therefore codifies the
intuition that the arrival of new agents will require downward revision of awards. In contrast with
its application in other settings, this version of population monotonicity is very mild, satisfied by all
seriously considered rules and in fact implied by consistency together with endowment monotonicity
(Chun, 1999).
Although our application to claims problems is new, the guarantee structures we study parallel
related notions first defined to compare anonymous and (weakly) Pareto-efficient bargaining so-
lutions (Thomson and Lensberg, 1983; Thomson, 1983a). In this context, the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution maximizes guarantees (Thomson and Lensberg, 1983) whereas the Nash solution maxi-
mizes group guarantees (Thomson, 1983a). A related measure asks how the original agents share
the sacrifice required to include the arriving agents. Seeking to minimize the maximum disparity of
sacrifice among these agents leads to characterizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky and Egalitarian
solutions. Recognizing that the arrival of new agents may make some original agents better off,
solutions may be further compared according to the opportunities they create (Thomson, 1987).
Our analysis of dual guarantees, although formally distinct, follows the spirit of this approach.
To formally compare these results to ours, we may view claims problems as a subclass of
bargaining problems with “rectangular” structure. Here, both the Nash and lexicographic extension
of the egalitarian solution correspond to the constrained equal awards rules (Dagan and Volij, 1993).
Similarly, weighted Nash solution with weights determined by the claims and the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution correspond respectively to the proportional and truncated proportional rules (Dagan and
Volij, 1993). Like the Nash solution, the constrained equal awards rule maximizes group guarantees.
However, group guarantees no longer distinguish the Nash and egalitarian solutions as these rules
24Some of the focal and recent applications include: Moulin and Shenker (2001), Hashimoto and Saitoh (2015),
Moulin (2008), Juarez (2008), and Masso´ et al. (2015) for cost sharing; Bhalgat et al. (2011) and Bogomolnaia and
Moulin (2014) for probabilistic assignment; and Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999), Roughgarden and Tardos
(2002), Roughgarden (2002), and Anshelevich et al. (2008) for network routing.
25The 1
n
-truncated-claims lower bound is introduced as “securement” by Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2004), called
the “secured lower bound” by (Yeh, 2008), and decomposed into sub-properties in Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006a).
The conditional equal division lower bound first appears in Moulin (2002) under the name “lower bound.” It implies
“exemption” (Herrero and Villar, 2001; Yeh, 2006) and is closely related to “sustainability” (Moreno-Ternero and
Villar, 2004; Yeh, 2006). Extending lower bounds to baselines leads to related “baseline first” composition properties
(Hougaard et al., 2012, 2013). For a complete discussion of lower bounds and generalizations, see Thomson (2015a).
26This axiom is first proposed for axiomatic bargaining where it is a key property in characterizations of the
Kalai-Smorodinsky and egalitiarian solutions (Thomson, 1983b,c).
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coincide on the smaller domain. Like its bargaining counterpart, the truncated proportional rule
maximizes guarantees. This is because it coincide with the constrained equal awards rule when
the endowment is no larger than the smallest claim. As many rules even in the TAL-family also
maximize guarantees, the truncated proportional rule is far from uniquely identified on the smaller
domain.
Conceptual differences between the claims and bargaining model are also important to the study
of guarantees. For example, whereas adding monetary awards of agents in claims problems is natural
and meaningful, bargaining problems lack a common similar common scale rendering summation
of utilities across agents suspect. Similarly, while the relation between the zero and claims points
immediately suggests a notion of duality in claims problems, general bargaining problems lack
an obvious upper reference point; different choices are possible, none with compelling conceptual
interpretation. Consequently, there is no analog of our Theorem 2 nor of the measure Gˆ.
While our goal has been to maximize guarantees, our guarantee structures also facilitate com-
parisons among rules which do not achieve the maximum guarantees. An important avenue for
further research would identify and compare the guarantee structures of rules in families beyond
the TAL-family. Another approach would derive the consequences for guarantee structures of other
desirable properties, identifying those guarantees compatible with or implied by various mono-
tonicity and independence properties, lower bounds, and operators on rules. Similarly, while our
guarantees consider the possibility of new agents arriving, other hypotheticals are possible. For
example, our measures could be adapted to define the worst-case revision to awards following a
reduction in the the endowment or an increase in the claims of other agents. Given the adaptabil-
ity of the underlying principles, as well as the numerous fruitful applications of worst-case analysis
generally, we further expect that analogues of guarantee structures will provide rich information
about allocation methods in a broad range of settings from surplus sharing to marriage problems
and school assignment. Similarly, revisiting classical results on worst case analysis, the richer
information of guarantee structures may improve our understanding of these familiar problems.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let ϕ be an endowment monotonic and consistent rule, n,m ∈ N, N,M ∈ N with N ∩M =
∅, |N | = n, and |M | = m, i ∈ N , and cˆ ∈ RM+ .
Step 1: G(ϕ, 1,m) = G(ϕ, n,m). First let (c, E) ∈ C{i}, c′ ≡ (c, cˆ), x ≡ ϕ(c, E), and y ≡
ϕ(c′, E). Now define c¯ ∈ RN+ such that c¯i = ci and for each j ∈ N\{i}, c¯j = 0, c¯′ ≡ (c¯, cˆ),
x¯ ≡ ϕ(c¯, E), and y¯ ≡ ϕ(c¯′, E). Then for each j ∈ N\{i}, ϕj(c¯, E) = ϕj(c¯′, E) = 0. By consistency,
x¯i = xi and y¯i = yi. Therefore, G(ϕ, n,m) ≤ y¯ix¯i =
yi
xi
. Since this is true for (c, E) ∈ C{i},
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G(ϕ, n,m) ≤ G(ϕ, 1,m).
Next let (c, E) ∈ CN , c′ ≡ (c, cˆ), x ≡ ϕ(c, E), and y ≡ ϕ(c′, E). Now define c¯ ≡ (ci, cˆ),
E¯ ≡ min{ci,∑j∈M∪{i} yj}, x¯ ≡ ϕ(ci, E), and y¯ ≡ ϕ(c¯, E¯). By endowment monotonicity, y¯i ≤ yi.
First suppose that E¯ = ci. Then xi ≤ ci = E¯ = x¯i and y¯ix¯i ≤
yi
xi
. Suppose instead that E¯ = E.
Then by consistency, x¯i = xi and y¯i = yi, so
y¯i
x¯i
= yixi . Since this is true for (c, E) ∈ CN ,
G(ϕ, 1,m) ≤ G(ϕ, n,m). Altogether, G(ϕ, 1,m) = G(ϕ, n,m).
Step 2: G(ϕ, n,m) = Gˆ(ϕ, n,m). First, the ratio of total awards is at least as large as the
smallest individual ratio: min
{
yi
xi
}
≤
∑
i∈N yi∑
i∈N xi
. Therefore, G(ϕ, n,m) ≤ Gˆ(ϕ, n,m). To show the
reverse inequality, by Step 1, it suffices to show that Gˆ(ϕ, n,m) ≤ G(ϕ, 1,m).
Let (c, E) ∈ C{i}, c′ ≡ (c, cˆ), x ≡ ϕ(c, E), and y ≡ ϕ(c′, E). Now define c¯ ∈ RN+ such that c¯i = ci
and for each j ∈ N\{i}, c¯j = 0, c¯′ ≡ (c¯, cˆ), x¯ ≡ ϕ(c¯, E), and y¯ ≡ ϕ(c¯′, E). Then for each j ∈ N\{i},
ϕj(c¯, E) = ϕj(c¯
′, E) = 0. Therefore,
Gˆ(ϕ, n,m) ≤
∑
j∈N y¯j∑
j∈N x¯j
=
y¯i
x¯i
=
yi
xi
.
Since this is true for (c, E) ∈ C{i}, Gˆ(ϕ, n,m) ≤ G(ϕ, 1,m). Altogether, G(ϕ, n,m) = Gˆ(ϕ, n,m).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let ϕ be an endowment monotonic and consistent rule.
(i). By Step 1 in the proof of Lemma 1, for each pair n,m ∈ N, G(ϕ, 1,m) = G(ϕ, n,m), so it
suffices to consider the case 1 = n < m. By Lemma 2, the maximal guarantee in this case is
G(ϕ, n,m) = G(ϕ, 1,m) = 11+m .
First suppose that ϕ satisfies the 1n -truncated-claims lower-bound. Let m ∈ N, N ∈ N with
|N | = 1 + m, (c, E) ∈ CN , and i ∈ N . If ci ≥ E, then ϕi(c, E) ≥ E1+m . Since ϕi(ci, E) = E,
ϕi(c,E)
ϕi(ci,E)
≥ E/(1+m)E = 11+m . Suppose instead that ci ≤ E. For each E′ ∈ R+ with E′ ≤ ci, by
ϕi(c, E
′) ≤ ϕi(c, E). By the 1n -truncated-claims lower-bound, ϕi(c, E′) ≥ E
′
1+m . Since ϕi(ci, E
′) =
E′, ϕi(c,E
′)
ϕi(ci,E′) ≥
E′/(1+m)
E′ =
1
1+m . Together, these inequalities show that G(1,m) ≥ 11+m .
Conversely, suppose that ϕ violates the 1n -truncated-claims lower-bound. Since a violation
requires at least two agents, there are m ∈ N, N ∈ N with |N | = 1 + m, (c, E) ∈ CN ,
and i ∈ N such that ϕi(c, E) < 11+m min{ci, E}. Let E′ ≡ ci. By endowment monotonic,
ϕi(c, E
′) ≤ ϕi(c, E) < 11+m min{ci, E} ≤ E
′
1+m . Since ϕi(ci, E
′) = E′, ϕi(c,E
′)
ϕi(ci,E′) <
E′/(1+m)
E′ =
1
1+m .
Therefore, G(1,m) < 11+m and ϕ fails to maximize guarantees.
(ii). By extension of Theorem 2 in Herrero and Villar (2001), if ϕ satisfies the conditional equal di-
vision lower-bound, then ϕ = CEA. Conversely, by Theorem 1, if ϕ maximizes average guarantees,
then ϕ = CEA.
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A.3 Independence of axioms
Example 2 shows that consistency is required in Theorem 1. To maximize group guarantee, the rule
“switches” from the path of the less egalitarian Talmud rule to the more egalitarian constrained
equal awards rule as the size of the population increases. Although this violates consistency, the
rule continues to maximize group guarantees. Whether endowment continuity is independent in
Theorem 1 is an open question.
Example 2. A endowment continuous and endowment monotonic rule that satisfies
equal treatment of equals and maximizes group guarantees. For each N ∈ N and each
(c, E) ∈ CN , let
ϕ(c, E) ≡
T (c, E) if |N | = 2CEA(c, E) otherwise .
It is immediate that ϕ is endowment continuous and endowment monotonic and satisfies equal
treatment of equals. We verify that ϕ maximizes group guarantees. Let n,m ∈ N. First, if
n 6= 2 and n+m 6= 2, then ϕ applies CEA for all populations of the relevant sizes and G¯(ϕ, n,m) =
G¯CEA(n,m) = nn+m . Also, since all rules coincide for one-claimant problems, G¯(ϕ, 1, 1) = G¯T (1, 1) =
1
2 = G¯CEA(1, 1).
Now consider n = 2 and let N,M ∈ N with N∩M = ∅, |N | = n, and |M | = m. Let (c, E) ∈ CN
with c1 ≤ c2 and cˆ ∈ RM+ . Then ϕ(c, E) = T (c, E) and ϕ((c, cˆ), E) = CEA((c, cˆ), E). First, if either
c1 = 0 or E ≤ c1, then ϕ(c, E) = CEA(c, E) and the group guarantee for CEA applies. Suppose
instead that 0 < c1 < E. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: E ≤ (2 +m)c1. Then ϕ(c, E) =
(
c1
2 , E − c12
)
and for each i ∈ N , ϕi((c, cˆ), E) ≥ En+m =
E
2+m . The average ratio is at least
1
2
(
E/(2 +m)
c1/2
+
E/(2 +m)
E − c1/2
)
=
E
2(2 +m)
· E
c1/2 · (E − c1/2) =
E2
(2 +m)c1(E − c1/2) .
As E varies, E
2
c1(E−c1/2) attains a minimum at E = c1 in which case
E2
c1(E−c1/2) = 2. Therefore,
E2
(2+m)c1(E−c1/2) ≥ 22+m and the maximum group guarantee is achieved.
Case 2: E > (2 +m)c1. Then ϕ1((c, cˆ), E) = c1. Also, ϕ(c, E) ≤ (c1, c2) and ϕ(c, E) ≤ (E,E).
If m ≥ 2, then the average ratio is at least
1
2
(
c1
c1
+
c1
c2
)
>
1
2
(
1 + 0
)
=
1
2
≥ 2
2 +m
.
If m = 1, then ϕ2((c, cˆ), E) ≥ E3 and the average ratio is at least
1
2
(
c1
c1
+
E/3
E
)
>
1
2
(
1 +
1
3
)
=
2
3
=
2
2 +m
.
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Therefore, ϕ maximizes group guarantee.
Among consistent rules, many maximize guarantees. For example, the constrained equal awards
rule is consistent and maximizes guarantees, as do all rules constructed in Example 1. Similarly,
the constrained equal losses rule is consistent and maximizes dual guarantees, as do as the duals of
all rules constructed in Example 1. Example 3 show the independence of consistency in Theorem 2.
The rule modifies the Talmud rule by carefully altering the “drop out” points so that guarantees
and dual guarantees continue to be maximized. Of course, this rule is not consistent.
Example 3. A endowment continuous, endowment monotonic, and self dual rule that
maximizes guarantees and maximum dual guarantees. For each N ∈ N and each (c, E) ∈
CN with |N | = 3 and c1 ≤ c2 ≤ c3, let
ϕ(c, E) ≡

(
E
3 ,
E
3 ,
E
3
)
if E ≤ c1(
c1
3 ,
c1
3 +
E−c1
2 ,
c1
3 +
E−c1
2
)
if c1 < E ≤ c2(
c1
3 +
E−c2
3 ,
c1
3 +
c2−c1
2 +
E−c2
3 ,
c1
3 +
c2−c1
2 +
E−c2
3
)
if c2 < E ≤ c2 + c12(
c1
2 ,
c2
2 ,
c2
2 + (E − c2 − c12 )
)
if c2 +
c1
2 < E ≤ c1+c2+c32
c− ϕ(c, c1 + c2 + c3 − E) if E < c1+c2+c32
and ϕ(c, E) = T (c, E) otherwise. That is, ϕ modifies T so that agent 1 “drops out” earlier: Under
T , all agents share equally the incremental endowment between c1 and
3
2c1 and then agents 2 and 3
share the incremental endowment between 32c1 and c2 − c1; ϕ reverses these increments.
From the definition, ϕ is endowment continuous, endowment monotonic, and self dual. By self
dual, it suffices to show that ϕ maximizes guarantees. Let N,M ∈ N with N ∩M = ∅, (c, E) ∈ CN ,
and cˆ ∈ RM+ . Let n ≡ |N | and m ≡ |M |. Since ϕ differs from T only for three-claimant problems,
there are three cases to consider.
Case 1: n = 1 and m = 2. Then E ≤ ci and (ci, E) ∈ C{i} so that ϕi((c, cˆ), E) ≥ E3 . Since
ϕi(ci, E) = E, the ratio for agent i is at least
E/3
E =
1
3 . Therefore, G(ϕ, 1, 2) ≥ 13 .
Case 2: n = 2 and m = 1. Then N = {i, j} and E ≤ ci + cj so (c{i,j}, E) ∈ C{i,j}. If
ϕi((c, cˆ), E) ≥ ci2 , then the ratio for agent i is at least 12 , so suppose instead that ϕi((c, cˆ), E) < ci2
so E ≤ c1+c2+c32 . Then ϕ2((c, cˆ), E) ≥ T2((c, cˆ), E) and ϕ3((c, cˆ), E) ≥ T3((c, cˆ), E), so suppose
i = 1. Then E ≤ c2 + c12 . If E ≤ c1, then ϕ1(c, E) = E2 and ϕ1((c, cˆ), E) = E3 so the ratio for
agent 1 is E/3E/2 =
2
3 . If E > c1, then ϕ1(c, E) =
c1
2 and ϕ((c, cˆ), E) =
c1
3 so the ratio for agent 1 is
c1/3
c1/2
= 23 . Altogether, G(ϕ, 2, 1) ≥ 12 .
Case 3: n = 3. Let i ∈ N . Since ϕ((c, cˆ), E) = T ((c, cˆ), E), if ϕi(c, E) ≤ Ti(c, E), then the ratio
for agent i is at least GT (n,m), so suppose instead that ϕi(c, E) > Ti(c, E). There are two subcases.
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Subcase 3.1: i 6= 1 and c1 ≤ E ≤ c2 + c12 . If ϕi((c, cˆ), E) ≥ ci2 , then the ratio for agent i is at least
1
2 , so suppose ϕi((c, cˆ), E) <
ci
2 . Then ϕi((c, cˆ), E) ≥ En+m . If c2 ≤ E, then ϕi(c, E) ≤ c22 and the
ratio for agent i is at least
ϕi((c, cˆ), E)
ϕi(c, E)
≥ E/(n+m)
c2/2
=
2
n+m
· E
c2/2
>
4
n+m
=
4
m+ 3
≥ 1
1 +m
.
If E < c2, then ϕi(c, E) =
c1
3 +
E−c1
2 and the ratio for agent i is at least
ϕi((c, cˆ), E)
ϕi(c, E)
≥ E/(n+m)
E/2− c1/6 ≥
1
n+m
· E
E/2
>
2
n+m
=
2
m+ 3
≥ 1
1 +m
.
Subcase 3.2: i = 1 and c3 +
c1
2 ≤ E ≤ c2 + c3. Then ϕ1(c, E) ≤ 2c13 and ϕ1((c, cˆ), E) = T1((c, cˆ), E).
If ϕ1((c, cˆ), E) ≥ c13 , then the ratio for agent 1 is at least c1/32c1/3 = 12 . If instead ϕ1((c, cˆ), E) <
c1
3 ,
then ϕ1((c, cˆ), E) ≥ En+m and the ratio for agent 1 is at least
ϕ1((c, cˆ), E)
ϕ1(c, E)
≥ E/(n+m)
2c1/3
≥ 1
(n+m)
· c3 + c1/2
2c1/3
≥ 1
n+m
· 9
4
=
9
4(m+ 3)
≥ 1
1 +m
.
Altogether, G(ϕ, n,m) = 11+m . By self duality, ϕ also maximizes dual guarantees.
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